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NOTES
MIXED ARBITRABLE AND NONARBITRABLE
CLAIMS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION:
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.
V. BYRD
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act),'
overturning a long standing judicial policy against arbitration. 2 The Arbi-
tration Act provides that agreements to submit disputes to arbitration will be
as enforceable as any other contractual arrangement.' Courts have looked
favorably upon arbitration since enactment of the Arbitration Act,4 liberally
construing the Act so that all doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
claims are resolved in favor of arbitration.' In addition, arbitration has be-
come an attractive alternative to litigation because it is less expensive and
less time consuming for the parties.6 Moreover, it has proved particularly
useful in the area of securities law, where disputes often involve relatively
small amounts of money, and the parties therefore wish to resolve disputes
quickly and inexpensively.7
Following the stock market debacle of 1929, Congress enacted the securi-
ties laws to protect the investor and to aid the economy in its climb out of
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
2. See infra note 25.
3. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), infra note 33.
4. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251
(9th -Cir. 1973) (stating that the use of arbitration had been specifically endorsed by Congress
in the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore federal courts should encourage its use); Lund-
gren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 110 (9th Cir. 1962) (policy of the Arbitration Act is to con-
strue agreements in favor of arbitration); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (Congress intended to make agreements to arbitrate as en-
forceable as any other contract and therefore federal courts must abandon their hostility to
arbitration).
5. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
6. Litigation often involves substantial time lags due to the procedural rights exercised
by each party, and consequently, large attorneys' fees are often incurred. See infra text accom-
panying notes 176, 177, 230.
7. See Jacquin, Arbitration in Action on Wall Street, 1 ARB. J. 261, 261-62 (1946). Arbi-
tration as a method of dispute resolution was established on the New York Stock Exchange in
1817. Id. An Arbitration Committee was thereafter formed and it became one of the earliest
forums in the country for compulsory arbitration of business disputes. Id. at 262.
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the Depression.' One of the benefits these statutes provided for the investor
was the right to a federal forum to hear broker-investor disputes.9 Congress
granted this right believing that a federal forum would balance the bargain-
ing positions of the parties. 1 Nevertheless, the securities industry continued
to employ arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, including arbitra-
tion clauses within broker-investor agreements binding parties to submit dis-
putes to arbitration. Realizing that this practice allowed circumvention of
congressional intent in enacting the securities laws, the Supreme Court held
arbitration clauses unenforceable as applied to federal securities claims in the
seminal case of Wilko v. Swan.11 By this determination, the Court declared
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities claims.
12
In effect, the Court determined that when a federal securities claim is
brought, the securities acts are preeminent over the Arbitration Act. 3
The conflict between the securities laws and the Arbitration Act, however,
8. See infra note 40.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See infra note 47. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
does not contain a provision similar to § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, but case law has
established an implied private cause of action under § 10(b)(5) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 10(b)(5) (1982). See infra note 53. These cases find that a private right of action may be
implied from the 1934 Act and that it is in accord with congressional intent. See id.
10. The federal forum provides the investor the procedural guarantees of trial by jury, the
federal rules of evidence, full rights of discovery, and the right of judicial review. See Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (parties in arbitration have no right to trial
by jury, arbitrators receive no judicial instruction on the law and need not explain their deter-
minations, and judicial review of arbitral awards is limited); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469
F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972) (arbitrators not required to explain reasons for their award);
Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 34 ARB. J. 5, 10 (1979) (parties do not
have full discovery rights in arbitration, awards are rendered without reasons, and judicial
review of arbitral award is limited).
11. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court found that arbitration clauses in broker-investor
agreements effectively force an investor to waive the protection afforded by the securities acts.
Id. at 438. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
12. Although the Wilko Court never explicitly stated that federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction of federal securities claims, the effect of its holding and its interpretation of the
securities laws (see infra text accompanying notes 63-70) have caused federal courts to refer to
their jurisdiction of such claims as "exclusive." See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that an exception to the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), is necessary in an action alleging federal securities
violations in order to protect the "exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court over these
claims"); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that an
exception to the Federal Arbitration Act was formulated to preserve the "exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts" and that Wilko requires that federal securities claims be adjudicated in
federal court).
13. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. The Court stated that the policies of the Arbitration Act and
the securities laws are "not easily reconcilable," but held that when the two policies conflict,
the arbitration agreement must be found invalid in order to enforce Congress' intent to protect
the investor in the securities market. Id.
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was not resolved by the Court's decision in Wilko.14 In recent years, inves-
tors have brought numerous suits involving both federal and state law
claims. Although Wilko holds that the federal claims may not be submitted
to arbitration, an issue now under debate is how the federal courts should
handle pendent claims, state and common law actions arising out of the
same operative facts as the federal securities claim.' 5 The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue, and the circuit courts have split. 16 Some cir-
cuits hold that a federal court should retain jurisdiction of the pendent com-
mon law and state claims as well as the federal claims.' 7 Other courts,
however, have determined that pendent claims should go to arbitration after
judicial resolution of the federal action. 18 Courts supporting retention of all
claims at the federal level uphold the "intertwining" doctrine.19 These
courts find that federal and pendent claims are sometimes so "intertwined"
that the pendent claims cannot be decided without reviewing the facts and
14. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15. When a state or common law claim is alleged along with a federal claim, the federal
court has the power to assume jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim as well as the federal
cause of action. This is known as pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 724-26 (1966); FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 18-20, 42. The court will only assume pendent
jurisdiction when certain prerequisites are met. First, it must find that the federal claim satis-
fies the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the court. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Second,
the court must determine that the federal claim and the nonfederal claim constitute a single
case and that both claims derive from a common "nucleus of operative fact." Id. at 725, 728.
In other words, the same general facts must support both the federal and nonfederal, or pen-
dent, claim. However, even if all of the above prerequisites are met, the court may refuse to
assume pendent jurisdiction because its power in this area is discretionary. Id. at 726.
16. See On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals, Memo-
randum for the Petitioner at 6, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir),
cert. granted, No. 83-1708 (June 11, 1984).
17. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir), cert. granted, No. 83-
1708 (June 11, 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169
(11 th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977). These courts hold that
federal courts should assume jurisdiction over common law and state claims pendent to a
federal securities claim so that the federal court may preserve its exclusive jurisdiction of fed-
eral securities claims. See infra notes 108-27, 149 and accompanying text.
18. Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey
v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.,
661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981). These courts maintain that both the Arbitration Act and the
securities laws must be enforced, and that the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over federal
securities claims can be preserved by staying arbitration of the common law and state claims
pending judicial resolution of the federal claim. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
19. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that
the intertwining doctrine is an exception to the policy favoring arbitration, created to preserve
the courts' exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities claims); Hyman, Churning in Securities:
Full Compensation for the Investor, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 28 (1983) (intertwining doctrine
is an exception to the Arbitration Act allowing the courts to refuse to sever arbitrable and
nonarbitrable federal claims).
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issues relevant to resolution of the federal claim and vice versa. 20 Thus, if
issues relevant to the federal claim are decided in arbitration or state court,
the federal court may be deprived of its exclusive jurisdiction.2 '
Recently, the Supreme Court agreed to review a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,22 addressing the proper procedure for disposing of both federal and
state law claims in a securities case. In Byrd, a retired dentist signed a bro-
ker-investor contract providing that all disputes arising under the contract
be submitted to arbitration. 2 After losing much of the money invested,
Byrd brought suit under federal and state law.24 The issue before the
Supreme Court concerns whether all claims should be heard by a federal
court, as was decided by the Ninth Circuit, or whether the nonfederal claims
should be allowed to proceed to arbitration.
This Note will trace the history of the Federal Arbitration Act and the
securities acts and will review the public policy considerations behind these
laws. It will examine the Wilko decision and its resolution of the tension
between the Arbitration Act and the policies underlying the securities laws
as well as subsequent Supreme Court decisions enforcing arbitration agree-
ments. The Note will discuss the decisions of those courts of appeals that
have adopted either the intertwining doctrine or a bifurcated approach, not-
ing how each court balanced the goals of the two public policies at issue.
Recognizing the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC or Commis-
sion) recent efforts to protect the securities investor, the Note will comment
on that agency's role in the creation of improved arbitration procedures and
on its promulgation of a rule restricting the use of arbitration clauses. Fi-
nally, the Note will analyze the impact of the intertwining doctrine versus a
bifurcated approach on the investor, setting the stage for the Supreme
Court's treatment of the Byrd case.
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES FIELD
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
During the nineteenth century, American judges were hostile to arbitra-
20. See Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977) ("when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out non-arbitrable federal
securities law claims from arbitrable contract claims, a court should deny arbitration in order
to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities act claims"); Shapiro v. Jaslow,
320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
21. Miley, 637 F.2d at 335-36; Hyman, supra note 19, at 28-29.
22. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 83-1708 (June 11, 1984).
23. Id. at 553.
24. Id.
[Vol. 34:525
Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims
tion, an attitude adopted from the English courts.2 5 As the country grew,
however, the courts became congested 26 and American businessmen began
to press for resolution of business disputes through arbitration." Business-
men disliked the expense of litigation and distrusted the results, believing
that most disputes could be settled according to practical considerations.2"
American judges also began to realize the illogical nature of a policy against
arbitration based on English precedent, especially when their own courts
were overflowing with litigation.2 9 These judges began to criticize hostility
towards arbitration 30 and urged that legislative action be taken to overturn
25. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir.
1942); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The English judiciary's hostility
towards arbitration developed in the 1700s. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 982. One reason ad-
vanced for this hostility was that English judges, whose salaries came largely from fees, wished
to avoid loss of income. Id. at 983 n.14 (citing Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. Ex. 308, 313 (1856)).
Others contend, however, it was merely competitive spirit that drove the judges to obtain as
much litigation as possible. Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 238, 240 (1931). In any case, the English
courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements, stating that parties by contract cannot "oust"
the courts of jurisdiction. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983. See Sayre, Development of Commer-
cial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 603-05 (1928). The "ouster of jurisdiction" concept
became strong precedent and was adopted by American courts during the nineteenth century.
Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874)
("agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and
void"); Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1898) (arbitration agreement ousting
the courts of jurisdiction held unenforceable); Dickson Mfg. Co. v. American Locomotive Co.,
119 F. 488, 490 (M.D. Pa. 1902) (holding that an arbitration clause is revocable because par-
ties may not contract to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction").
26. See Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12
MINN. L. REV. 240, 258 (1928). The author cited statistics from the Literary Digest of Octo-
ber 4, 1924, showing that on January 1, 1923, 27,000 cases were awaiting trial "on the supreme
court calendars in New York County," and that while 8,000 cases could be disposed of within
a year, 13,000 new cases were added to the calendar each year. Id.; see also Cohen & Dayton,
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 269 (1926) (reviewing the problems
that the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to correct, including delays associated with
litigation due to congested court calendars).
27. Note, Effect of the United States Arbitration Act, 25 GEO. L.J. 443, 445, & n.20 (1937)
(stating that business support was part of a growing movement leading to enactment of the
Arbitration Act).
28. Id. at 445. Businessmen believed that court decisions often disregarded "common
principles of business." Id. Businessmen preferred practicality and quickness of result to
"principles of law." Id.
29. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
1942) (noting that lower federal courts felt bound to comply with precedents, although they
were critical of hostility towards arbitration); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad
Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing the custom of looking to
"the antiquity of the rule" rather than to "its excellence of reason"). See also Jones, supra note
26, at 257-58 (courts' abandonment of hostility to arbitration attributable to the increasing
volume of litigation).
30. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984-85. One federal court noted that no reason had ever
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the long line of precedent against arbitration. 3 Congress responded in 1925
by enacting the Arbitration Act.32
The Federal Arbitration Act (the Act) established a new policy, declaring
the validity, irrevocability and enforceability of any contractual agreement
submitting future disputes to arbitration.3 3 Courts can no longer refuse to
enforce valid arbitration agreements between parties. If an action is brought
before a court involving an issue referable to arbitration, the court must stay
litigation of the action pending arbitration.34 Thus, the only issues the court
need determine are whether there was an arbitration agreement made be-
tween the parties 5 and whether the claim before the court is governed by
been given for the statement that arbitration agreements are against public policy, except for
the weak "ouster of jurisdiction" principle. United States Asphalt Refining Co., 222 F. 1006,
1008-09. See supra note 25; see also Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F.2d
670, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1925); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) (it is the "duty of courts" to "free themselves from anachronistic rules and precedents
that are opposed to principles and standards of modem jurisprudence").
31. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross
Line, 5 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1924), wherein the court stated that efforts to induce Congress
to enact legislation had failed to date, and therefore the courts were being "asked to provide
some method of overriding, or explaining away not only its own previous decisions but those of
the Supreme Court. ... Id. The court concluded its opinion by stating that "the situation
is one calling for legislative action. ... Id. at 221.
32. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Act].
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Act provides:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
34. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 of the Act requires the federal court to stay the trial of
any action that is properly subject to arbitration under a written agreement between the par-
ties. The provision states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Section 4 requires the court to decide the arbitrability of a claim.
It provides in part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. . . . If the mak-
ing of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same
be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
Id. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)
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the agreement.36 In deciding the latter issue, all doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable claims are resolved in favor of arbitration.37 Thus, where an
arbitration clause contains ambiguous language, the court should adhere to
the meaning giving the broadest scope to arbitration.3" The courts liberally
construe arbitration clauses to give effect to Congress' intent to expedite and
facilitate the settlement of disputes and to ease court congestion.39 Congress
did not foresee, however, the conflict that would arise when it subsequently
enacted the securities laws.
B. The Federal Securities Acts
After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress, primarily wishing to pro-
tect the investor and to improve the depressed economy,' passed the Securi-
ties Act of 1933,41 followed by enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of
(stating that court's inquiry is limited to determining whether parties agreed to arbitrate);
Pollux Marine Agencies, Inc. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 435 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(courts confined to issue of whether parties agreed to arbitrate).
36. McAllister Bros. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1980) (court must
make a "threshold inquiry" into whether the arbitration agreement covers the dispute); Inter-
national Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Local 400, 286 F.2d 329, 330-31 (3d Cir. 1961)
(courts are limited to determining whether claim is governed by the arbitration agreement).
37. Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (doubts
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) (doubts regarding the construction of the Arbitration Act should
be resolved in keeping with the Act's "liberal policy of promoting arbitration").
38. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83 (arbitration should not be refused unless the
"arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute").
39. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The report states: "It is practi-
cally appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation
against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable." Id. See
also Robert Lawrence v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). The Second Circuit stated that courts should liberally construe
the Arbitration Act to enforce Congress' policy of promoting arbitration, "both to accord with
the original intention of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars."
Id.
40. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). In Naftalin, the Court, hold-
ing that the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits fraud against brokers as well as investors, stated
that while investor protection was not the only purpose of the 1933 Act, Congress' primary
intent was to prevent fraud against investors and to improve the economy. Id. See also A.C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941) ("essential purpose" of the
1933 Act is to protect investors); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) ("principal and essential purpose of the 1933 Act is to protect
investors").
41. The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982)).
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1934.42 Congress recognized that issuers and purchasers of securities do not
occupy relatively equal bargaining positions and sought to rectify this prob-
lem by requiring complete disclosure of information to the purchaser of se-
curities.43 Thus, the 1933 Act requires full disclosure of material
information to prospective purchasers of securities through filing of a regis-
tration statement with the SEC and issuance of a prospectus to the buyer.
44
The 1933 Act further imposes civil and criminal liabilities for misstatements
or failure to disclose required information. 45 Another method Congress em-
ployed to balance the relative bargaining positions of the parties was to pro-
vide access to a federal forum.46 Specifically, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
grants the investor a "special right" to recover for misrepresentation and to
proceed in federal court against the seller of the security.47 The right to sue
in federal court provides the buyer a broad choice of venue and nationwide
42. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
43. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). The report states that the policy of
the 1933 Act is to inform the investor of facts regarding securities offered for sale in interstate
commerce. Id. It further states:
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; . . . to protect...
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through
crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor . . . ; to
bring into productive channels of industry. . . capital which has grown timid to the
point of hoarding ....
Id.; see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) ("it is clear that the Securities Act was
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor").
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). This provision prohibits the sale or delivery after sale of
unregistered securities and further prohibits the sale or delivery after sale of any security,
unless accompanied by a prospectus. Id. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
130 (2d ed. 1961) (summarizing requirements of the 1933 Act).
45. Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the 1933 Securities Act impose civil liabilities for violations
of the registration and prospectus requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1982). Section 24
of the Act sets forth criminal penalties that may be imposed for any willful violation of any
provision of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982).
46. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 (in order to implement its policy to protect the investor,
Congress "created a special right to recover for misrepresentation").
47. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). The statute provides that an investor may bring an action
in any court having jurisdiction against a broker who, in selling securities to the investor,
misrepresented and/or omitted information regarding the sale of the stock. Specifically, it
states that any person who
(2) offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the pur-
chaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
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service of process.48 Although the buyer has the burden of proving the mis-
representation or omission, he or she must only prove lack of knowledge of
the untruth or omission.4 9 The burden then shifts to the seller to prove that
he or she did not know, and could not have reasonably known, of the
misrepresentation.o
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is an extension of the 1933 Act,
regulating securities transactions conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets.5 ' The primary purposes of the 1934 Act are to
require disclosure of certain information to the securities buyer, to prevent
and provide remedies for the manipulation of the securities markets, and to
control the amount of the nation's credit that goes into those markets.
52
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction ....
Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982). The provision states that any suit brought under the provi-
sions of the 1933 Act "may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the
defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." Id. See
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
49. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959) (buyer need not prove
reliance on the false statement to successfully recover under this provision); Murphy v. Cady,
30 F. Supp. 466, 470 (D. Me. 1939), affid, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705
(1940) (plaintiff held to have an action under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act where he had no knowl-
edge of seller's misrepresentations).
50. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 ("seller is made to assume the burden of proving lack of
scienter"). The House report accompanying the 1933 Act states: "Unless responsibility is to
involve merely paper liability it is necessary to throw the burden of disproving responsibility
for reprehensible acts of omission or commission on those who purport to issue statements for
the public's reliance . . . " H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933); see also 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1704-05 (2d ed. 1961) (§ 12(2) provides seller with a defense
if he can prove that he did not know, and could not have reasonably known, of the misrepre-
sentation or omission).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982). The section states that "transactions in securities...
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest" making regulation necessary. Id. The 1934 Act is concerned with post-distribution
trading, whereas, the 1933 Act regulates the distribution process. Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197
F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982). The provision states that regulation is necessary to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system
for securities and a national system for the clearance and settlement of securities
transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto, and to im-
pose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably com-
plete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the
Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking sys-
tem and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in such transactions: . . ..
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Although the 1934 Act does not include a provision similar to section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act, providing for a "private" remedy, case law has established
an implied cause of action." Thus, through enactment of the securities
laws, Congress established a strong policy of investor protection that has
been vigorously enforced in the courts.54 Twenty years later, however, Con-
gress' policy protecting the securities investor collided with its policy enforc-
ing arbitration agreements. The clash of these two policies resulted in the
Supreme Court decision of Wilko v. Swan."
C. The Wilko Doctrine-Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction of Federal
Securities Law Claims
In 1953, the Supreme Court created an exception to the Arbitration Act
when it held in Wilko v. Swan that agreements to submit disputes arising
under the Securities Act of 193356 to arbitration are unenforceable. Peti-
tioner, an investor, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York against partners in a securities brokerage
firm to recover damages under section 12(2)" 7 of the 1933 Act. He alleged
that respondents induced him to purchase certain stock, which he subse-
quently sold at a loss due to the firm's misrepresentation and omission of
information regarding trading of his stock.58 Petitioner's contract with the
53. A private remedy under rule lOb-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)(5) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982), has been recognized by most federal
courts. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) ("it is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)"); Jordan
Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1968) (agreeing with Seventh
Circuit's earlier holdings that a "private right of action exists under § 10(b)"); Janigan v. Tay-
lor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (personal action brought for
violations of rule lOb-5 arose "by implication of the Act"); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627,
632 (9th Cir. 1953) (allowing defrauded buyers and sellers to seek redress in federal courts
under § 10(b)(5) is in accord with Congress' intent to make the control of securities transac-
tions "reasonably complete and effective"); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787
(2d Cir. 1951) (holding that while § 10(b)(5) does not specifically authorize a civil, or private
remedy, it does find unlawful the conduct it describes, and therefore, creates a remedy).
54. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953) (stating Court should
focus on offerees' need for the protections afforded by the registration requirements); General
Life of Missouri Inv. Co. v. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774, 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that a
corporation's offer and sale of unregistered securities was not exempt from the registration
requirement because Congress desired to protect the investor through full disclosure); Associ-
ated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1961) (enforcing the securities laws'
policy of investor protection, the court affirmed that petitioners had committed fraud on its
customers in the sale of certain stock).
55. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
57. 346 U.S. at 429. See supra note 47.
58. 346 U.S. at 429. The broker did not inform Wilko that some or all of the stock he was
purchasing was being sold by a director of the subject corporation. Id.
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brokerage firm had included an arbitration clause and respondents moved to
stay the trial until arbitration.59 The district court denied the stay, holding
that the agreement deprived petitioner of the judicial remedy provided by
the Securities Act.6° A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, concluding that the Securities Act did not prohibit
agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue regarding
whether the Securities Act voids agreements to submit future disputes to
arbitration.62 In reversing the Second Circuit, the Court held that agree-
ments for arbitration of issues arising under the 1933 Act are invalid.63
Writing for the majority, Justice Reed noted that the public policy behind
the Securities Act was to protect the investor-to supplement the age old
rule of caveat emptor with the doctrine of "let the seller also beware.
' 64
This policy was implemented by granting the investor the special right to a
federal forum in section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 65 Although the Court ac-
knowledged the tension between this policy and that of the Arbitration Act,
which provides for speedy and economical resolution of disputes,66 it held
that the investor's right to a trial under the Securities Act may not be
waived. 67 The majority explained that a federal trial guarantees the investor
certain rights that are not available in arbitration, such as greater choice of
courts and venue, and judicial review.68 Justice Reed concluded that the
protective provisions of the Securities Act could not be effected if an investor
waived the right to trial. 69 Thus, after Wilko, courts and arbitrators de-
ferred to the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities
claims.7 O
The majority based its decision on section 14 of the Securities Act, which
voids all conditions, stipulations, or provisions that bind securities investors
59. Id.
60. Id. at 430.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 438.
64. Id. at 430 (quoting Presidential message included within H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
65. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66. 346 U.S. at 438. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. 346 U.S. at 435.
68. Id. at 435-37. The Court further noted that arbitrators make their decisions without
judicial instruction on the law and that grounds for vacating an award under the Arbitration
Act are limited. Id. at 436. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
69. 346 U.S. at 437.
70. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981); Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Shapiro v. Jaslow,
320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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to waive compliance with any provision of the Securities Act."' Justice Reed
explained that an agreement to arbitrate was a "stipulation ' 7 2 and that the
right to select the judicial forum was a "provision" under the Securities Act
that could not be waived.7" The Court concluded that Congress' intent in
enacting protective securities legislation could best be served by holding the
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Securities Act invalid.
7 4
Since the Wilko decision, which addressed claims arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, uncertainty has surfaced over whether agreements to arbi-
trate claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are also
unenforceable. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," the United States Supreme
Court explained that Wilko was brought under the "private remedy" provi-
sion of the 1933 Act and that the 1934 Act does not explicitly provide for a
private remedy.76 Case law, however, has established an implied cause of
action.77 The Scherk decision further noted that while both acts prohibit
"waivers of compliance" with any "provision" of the act, the provisions of
the 1933 Act held nonwaivable in Wilko have no counterpart in the 1934
Act.78 Generally, however, courts have held that Wilko is equally applicable
to both the 1933 and 1934 Acts,79 noting the similarity between the an-
71. 346 U.S. at 434-35. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides: "Any condition, stipu-
lation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
72. 346 U.S. at 434. See supra note 71.
73. 346 U.S. at 435. See supra note 71.
74. 346 U.S. at 438.
75. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
76. Id. at 513-14. The Court stated that there is no "statutory counterpart" of § 12(2) in
the 1934 Act and that while § 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides that the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of registered securities is illegal, it
does not set forth a private remedy to redress violations of the provision. Id. at 513.
77. Id. at 513-14. See supra note 53.
78. 417 U.S. at 514. The Court stated that the 1933 Act allows the plaintiff to bring suit
in "any court of competent jurisdiction," 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982), while the 1934 Act provides
that suit may only be brought in federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction," 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
79. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir.
1984) (noting that lower courts have consistently held that Wilko also applies to claims arising
under the 1934 Act); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977) (stating that the similarities between the 1933 and 1934 Acts outweigh any
differences and therefore Wilko applies to both the 1933 and 1934 Acts); Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.5 (2d Cir. 1964) (§ 14 of the 1933 Act, relied on by the
Wilko Court, is almost identical to § 29(a) of the 1934 Act); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 27-28 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that an arbitration agreement
may not waive a federal cause of action under the 1934 Act); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F.
Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Wilko is "equally applicable" to the 1934 Act).
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tiwaiver provisions of each act.8"
The Court's decision in Scherk is noteworthy, however, because it en-
forced an arbitration agreement included as part of an international business
contract, despite alleged federal securities violations. 8 Under the contract
80. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) with 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982). See supra note 71 and
infra note 114; see also Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 704 (1980). Predispute
arbitration agreements have been held unenforceable with respect to the following sections of
the 1934 Act: § 7, Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); § 10(b), Weiss-
buch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v.
Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010
(1976); § 15(c)(1), Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974).
81. Recently, the Supreme Court has upheld the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
nonsecurities cases. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983), the Court held that a district court had improperly stayed a federal action pending
resolution of a concurrent state court suit, id. at 4, stating that the Arbitration Act requires
"piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Id. at 20.
The petitioner, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Hospital), entered into a contract with
defendant Mercury Construction Corporation (Mercury), for construction of additions to the
Hospital. Id. at 4. Under the agreement, contract disputes were initially to be referred to the
architect and then could be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 4-5. When a dispute arose regard-
ing extended overhead and cost overruns claimed by Mercury, however, the Hospital sought a
judgment in state court that there was no right to arbitration and that it was not liable to
Mercury. Id. at 7. The Hospital was subsequently granted an injunction forbidding Mercury
to proceed towards arbitration, but the stay was dissolved pursuant to Mercury's objection.
Id. Mercury then filed in federal court, seeking an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the
Arbitration Act. Id. See supra note 35. The district court stayed the action, pending the
resolution of the state court suit, but the court of appeals reversed and entered an order to
arbitrate. 460 U.S. at 7-8. The Supreme Court affirmed noting that the Arbitration Act re-
quires any uncertainty regarding the arbitrability of issues to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. Id. at 24-25, 29.
The Moses case differs from the securities cases in that there was no federal law or policy
that conflicted with the Arbitration Act. The issue in Moses was simply whether the federal
suit should be stayed in deference to the parallel state suit. Id. at 13. The Court found that the
presence of a federal law issue, arbitrabilityas required by the Federal Arbitration Act, was "a
major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal jurisdiction]." Id. at 26. Thus,
resolution of the dispute between the Hospital and Mercury would require two separate suits,
one in federal court and one in state court. Id. at 19-20. Although the Court had previously
stated that the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation is a factor weighing towards dismis-
sal of a federal suit in the face of a concurrent state suit, it now held that a bifurcated resolu-
tion was necessary to uphold the policy established by the Arbitration Act. Id. at 20.
In an even more recent case, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act preempts a
California franchise statute. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984), franchisees,
who had signed a contract containing an arbitration clause, filed suit in state court alleging
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and fiduciary duty, and violation of disclosure
requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law. Id. at 853. The franchisor's subse-
quent motion to compel arbitration was granted, except for those claims based on the state's
franchise investment law. Id. The state appellate court reversed, holding that the state law did
not invalidate arbitration agreements. The state's highest court disagreed, however, interpret-
ing the statute to require judicial consideration of claims arising under it. Id. at 858. The
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between Alberto-Culver, an American manufacturer, and Scherk, a German
citizen, Scherk granted Alberto-Culver all trademark rights of three foreign
enterprises it had purchased, guaranteeing that the trademarks were unen-
cumbered. 2 When Alberto-Culver subsequently discovered that the trade-
marks were encumbered, it brought suit in federal court alleging that Scherk
had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through his misrepresenta-
tions." The contract, however, provided that all disputes would be arbi-
trated in Paris, France, and that the laws of Illinois would govern the
agreement.8 4 Scherk moved to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris,
but his motion was denied on the basis of the Wilko decision. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.8 5
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Seventh Circuit in a five to
four decision, 6 finding that the international character of the contract in
dispute distinguished it from the contract in Wilko. The Court noted that
the parties to the contract were a German citizen and an American com-
pany, that negotiations took place in the United States, England, and Ger-
many, that the contract was executed in Austria, and that the business
enterprises purchased by Alberto-Culver were organized and located primar-
ily in Europe. 7 In contrast, the parties, the negotiations, and the subject
matter of the contract in Wilko were all located in one country, the United
States.88 The majority in Scherk emphasized that arbitration and forum
clauses in international contracts are necessary to avoid the disorder and
uncertainty that may accompany a dispute arising under an international
Supreme Court reversed on this issue, stating that the California high court's interpretation
"directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause."
Id.
Southland also differs from the majority of the securities cases involving the Arbitration Act,
because it is concerned with a state law that conflicts with a federal law, rather than with two
conflicting federal laws. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the Court's strong support for the poli-
cies underlying the Arbitration Act and emphasizes that the Act is applicable in state as well
as federal courts. Id. at 860-61.
82. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508.
83. Id. at 509.
84. Id. at 508.
85. Id. at 510. The court of appeals' decision was based on its finding that the business
transaction involved a "security" within the purview of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id.
86. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist were in
the majority with Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissenting.
87. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
88. Id. at 515-16. The Court explained that in Wilko it was indisputable, with or without
an arbitration provision, that the laws of the United States would govern controversies arising
out of the stock-purchase agreement. Id. at 515. However, without an arbitration provision in
Scherk, much uncertainty would exist regarding the law applicable to resolution of disputes
arising out of the agreement. Id. at 516.
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contract governed by the substantive law of each country it touches.8 9
Therefore, to avoid this uncertainty and to better enable businessmen to
enter into international agreements, the Court held that the parties' agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes arising out of their international contract should
be enforced.9°
The four dissenters in Scherk refused to find the international character of
the agreement controlling; rather, they believed that the Wilko doctrine
should apply.91 The dissenters explained that the public policy of the securi-
ties acts and the Wilko decision is to protect the investor,92 and that the
international aspects of an agreement should not deprive an investor of that
protection. 93
The minority did concede that the parties in Scherk were sophisticated
buyers and sellers who did not necessarily need the protection afforded the
small investor in Wilko. 94 Several commentators have suggested that the
equal bargaining power of the parties was one reason for the outcome in the
Scherk case.95 One writer espousing this theory argued that the Court bal-
89. Id. at 516. The Court speculated that in the absence of forum and arbitration clauses
in international contracts, parties would engage in "jockeying" to secure the most favorable
forum for their claim, possibly resulting in the dispute being submitted to a forum "hostile to
the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved." Id.
90. Id. at 519-20. The Court noted that its holding was reinforced by the United States'
legislative adoption of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards in chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
The purpose of the Convention is to encourage the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
international contracts. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n. 15.
91. Id. at 525.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 534. The dissenters conceded that certainty in international contracts is impor-
tant, but held that when the federal securities laws apply, they take precedence over arbitration
clauses. Id. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Douglas stated that section 29 of the 1934 Act,
which voids arbitration clauses, "recognizes no exception for fraudulent dealings which inci-
dentally have some international factors." Id.
94. Id. at 525-26. Scherk was a "powerful German operator" and Alberto-Culver was an
American manufacturer, aided by lawyers and experts. Id.
95. See Note, International Arbitration-Extraterritorial Application of United States Se-
curities Laws Denied; Arbitration Clause in Investment Contract Enforced, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J.
705, 714-15 (1975) (Wilko and Scherk can be distinguished by the difference in bargaining
power of the parties); Note, International Commercial Arbitration and the Federal Securities
Laws, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 383, 392-94 (1974) (judicial protection is appropriate where
plaintiff has purchased securities from a brokerage firm, but is hardly necessary between the
two sophisticated businesss parties in Scherk). The Scherk exception to the Wilko doctrine is
comparable to the exception carved out for arbitration of disputes between securities exchange
member firms, who are also perceived to be on equal bargaining grounds. See, e.g., Axelrod &
Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1971). In holding that an
arbitration agreement between two exchange member firms is exempt from the nonwaiver pro-
visions of the 1934 Act, the Second Circuit stated in Axelrod that the Wilko decision was based
on the legislative policy of protecting investors, who may occupy inferior bargaining positions
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anced the two broad policies of the securities laws and the Arbitration Act
and that because Scherk involved two savvy business parties, the indispens-
ability of arbitration in international business outweighed the securities acts'
policy to protect the investor.96 Thus, in Scherk, the Court found that the
policy of the securities laws is not always preeminent.97 Rather, the Court
implied that it is necessary in each case to look at the needs and interests of
the American investor in the context of the policies of the securities laws and
the Arbitration Act. 98
II. ARBITRABLE AND NONARBITRABLE CLAIMS IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS: THE INTERTWINING DOCTRINE OR A BIFURCATED
RESOLUTION?
After Scherk, the courts faced a new dilemma involving the tension be-
tween the securities laws and the Arbitration Act. Investors often bring
suits alleging common law and state claims in addition to federal securities
claims.99 State claims, based on the contractual and fiduciary relationship
between the broker and investor, 10° commonly involve breach of contract" ° '
with respect to brokerage firms. Id. The Second Circuit further explained that this policy
would not be hampered by enforcement of arbitration agreements between member firms. Id.
96. See Note, supra note 95, at 715.
97. See id. at 720. The author notes that while the Supreme Court has encouraged and
supported the policies of the securities laws, it has conceded "[w]e cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets. . . exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved
in our courts." Id. (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
98. See id. (Scherk makes clear that the "Court intends to focus on how best to protect the
interests of the American investor.").
99. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's
amended complaint included four counts: one federal securities law count, and three counts
alleging various state law tort and contract claims, based upon essentially the same facts rele-
vant to the federal claim); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977) (plaintiff's complaint included four breach of contract counts, one federal
and one state securities law count, and one common law fraudulent misrepresentation count,
all of which arose out of the same facts); Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp.
762, 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (alleging common law fraud along with violations of § 10(b) of the
1934 Act and § 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
100. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979) (bro-
ker-dealer owes customer a high degree of fiduciary care); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (broker owed his customer a
fiduciary duty); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (broker handling a discretionary account is a "fiduciary of his customer in a
broad sense"). Discretionary accounts are those in which the broker determines which
purchases and sales to make, whereas, in the case of a nondiscretionary account, the customer
determines what transactions will occur. Id. A broker handling a nondiscretionary account,
however, still owes a fiduciary duty to the customer-just not as broad a duty as that owed to a
discretionary account customer. See id.
101. See, e.g., Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1021 (plaintiff alleged breach of contract with viola-
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and breach of fiduciary duty. 10 2 Common law actions are often claims of
fraud.'" 3 If there exists a predispute arbitration agreement, that is, an agree-
ment to submit future disputes arising under the agreement to arbitrators for
resolution,""° these common law and state claims may be submitted to arbi-
tration.'05 Under Wilko, however, predispute arbitration agreements are un-
enforceable as applied to federal securities claims. 10 6  The question,
therefore, becomes whether the common law and state claims are arbitrable
if they are joined with a nonarbitrable federal securities claim. When such
claims are joined, they are often referred to as mixed arbitrable and nonarbi-
trable claims.'0 7
The first federal appeals court to encounter the issue of mixed arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims in a securities case was the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In Sibley v. Tandy Corp.,' the Tandy Corpo-
tions of the federal securities laws when broker failed to properly execute plaintiff's order to
purchase certain options); Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543 (plaintiff alleged breach of contract in addi-
tion to common law fraud and federal and state securities law violations in an action regarding
a corporate merger agreement).
102. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169, 1172
(11 th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duty with violations of the federal securi-
ties laws when defendants misrepresented the management of her account and purchased se-
curities without her authority); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 951, 952-53 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (plaintiff successfully alleged breach of fiduciary duty
with "churning" violation under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because bro-
ker owned plaintiff a high fiduciary duty in the handling of plaintiff's discretionary account).
103. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir.
1984). In Surman, plaintiff sought damages based on common law fraud as well as for viola-
tions of the federal and state securities laws in an action alleging loss of funds due to improper
management of accounts and misrepresentations regarding the accounts. Id.; see also Haydu,
675 F.2d at 1172 (alleging fraud and misrepresentation in handling of securities account in
addition to violations of federal and state securities laws); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55,
56 (S.D. Fla 1976) (alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and common
law fraud and misrepresentation).
104. Krause, supra note 80, at 709 n.97.
105. See DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (state law claims arising
from securities transaction held arbitrable under arbitration clauses in agreement pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (common law securities claims held arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act).
106. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g.. Surman, 733 F.2d at 62 (noting the argument that bifurcation of "mixed
lawsuits" is inefficient); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 1983) (not-
ing one court's holding that the Arbitration Act does not apply to "mixed claims"); Cunning-
ham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 581 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (intertwining
doctrine developed to aid courts confronted with a "mixed claims" issue).
108. 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977). The Fifth Circuit
followed the result reached by a lower court in Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). In Shapiro, plaintiff brought suit against both the brokerage firm and the broker who
handled his account. Id. at 599. The defendant brokerage firm, alleging that plaintiff's claims
were only common law claims, moved to stay the action and to compel arbitration, as provided
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ration and P.J. Parker, Inc. had entered into a merger agreement under
which Parker shareholders were to be paid in Tandy stock, two thirds upon
surrender of the Parker shares and the remaining third held in an escrow
account pending verification of Parker's stated net worth. °9 The parties
agreed that all disputes arising under the agreement would be submitted to
arbitration." 0 When Tandy's auditors determined that Parker's net worth
was substantially less than represented, Tandy ordered the bank to impound
the escrowed stock."' Sibley, the designated representative of the Parker
shareholders, brought suit against Tandy alleging breach of contract and
fraudulent misrepresentation as well as violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.112
The district court, recognizing that the federal count was not subject to
arbitration, refused to sever the other counts and to submit them to arbitra-
tion.113 The court based its decision on the ground that the claims were so
"intertwined" that to sever them would violate section 78cc, the antiwaiver
provision of the 1934 Act. 1 4 Section 78cc prohibits stipulations, such as an
arbitration agreement, binding a person to waive compliance with a Securi-
ties Exchange Act provision, such as the right to select a judicial forum."'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that there are
instances when it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate nonarbitrable fed-
by the agreement between the parties. Id. The motion to compel arbitration was denied, be-
cause it was held that plaintiffs' claims were in fact based on the federal securities laws. Id.
The court held that under Wilko, agreements to arbitrate such claims are unenforceable. Id.
In the course of this litigation, however, defendant broker had filed a cross-claim against the
brokerage firm, alleging that the firm had failed to adhere to the business principles imposed
on it by the securities laws, the stock exchange rules, and common law. Id. at 600. While the
brokerage firm conceded that the claims under the securities laws could not be arbitrated, it
contended that the common law claims should proceed to arbitration. Id. at 599. The court,
however, refused to sever the claims and order the common law claims to arbitration, finding
that it would be "impractical, if not impossible" to separate out the common law claims. Id. at
600.
109. Sibley, 543 F.2d at 541.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court analyzed the various counts as follows:
(1) Count IV alleges a violation of rule lOb-5 of section 10b of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); (2) Counts I, II, III, V and VI allege
claims grounded in the contract of merger relating to defaults on the part of defend-
ants or reformation of the merger agreement.
Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
115. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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eral claims from arbitrable contract claims.116 The Fifth Circuit determined
that in such circumstances, it should preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over
federal securities law claims by denying arbitration.117 In this case, how-
ever, the court did not deem the claims before it sufficiently intertwined,
noting that the same facts did not underlie each claim.' 18
In Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co.," 9 the Fifth Circuit clarified the degree of
intertwining required to prevent submission of pendent claims to arbitration.
In Miley, a case involving mixed arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, Oppen-
heimer, the defendant broker, argued that the court should refuse to submit
arbitrable claims to arbitration only when the legal issues are inseparable. 20
Although the court agreed that common evidentiary facts underlying the
federal and pendent claims alone do not justify refusing to submit the
nonfederal claims to arbitration, it did not agree with Oppenheimer's inter-
pretation of the intertwining doctrine. 2 ' Rather, the court explained that
claims are intertwined "sufficiently when the same factual (and legal) con-
clusions must be drawn from the common evidentiary facts to resolve the
federal and pendent state claims."'122 The court concluded that when this
degree of intertwining between claims is present, there is a threat to the fed-
eral court's exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities claims, and therefore,
arbitration must be refused. '
23
The Fifth Circuit refused to order arbitration in Miley, holding that there
116. Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 543-44. The Fifth Circuit distinguished the claims alleged in Sibley from the
claims held to be intertwined in Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In
Shapiro, an arbitrator deciding the common law claims would have to deal with the same facts
needed to establish the federal claim. In Sibley, however, the court found that the federal
claim was dependent upon the contract claims. Plaintiffs complaint was essentially a breach
of contract claim and the federal securities claim was a fall-back position, predicated upon
plaintiff's first two positions being resolved against him. 543 F.2d at 543-44.
119. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. Id. at 335. The defendant contended that Miley's claims were not intertwined legally
because they were instituted on three separate causes of action: violation of the federal securi-
ties law; breach of fiduciary duty; and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act. Id. at 325 n.6, 335.
121. Id. at 335. The court concluded that pendent state claims almost never would be sent
to arbitration if common evidentiary facts were the only requirement of the intertwining doc-
trine. Id.
122. Id. at 335-36. In other words, claims are intertwined when a review of the common
facts would lead to the same decision for both the federal and pendent claims.
123. Id. at 336. In a case where both the federal judge and the arbitrator reach their con-
clusions from the same facts, the federal judge may be bound through collateral estoppel by the
previous findings 'of the arbitrator, thereby nullifying the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
court. Id.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
existed a sufficient degree of intertwining between claims.' 2 4 The plaintiff
investor had alleged breach of fiduciary duty as well as a violation of the
federal securities laws.
1 25
To illustrate, Judge Goldberg explained that an arbitrator might find that
the investment company did not breach the fiduciary duty owed its client
because the account was properly managed in light of the client's objectives.
This finding would provide the basis for resolving the federal case, 12 6 thus
obviating the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction.
27
Other courts, however, believed that arbitration could be ordered while
still preserving the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. These courts found
that if arbitration of common law and state claims was stayed pending judi-
cial resolution of the federal securities claim, there would be no threat to the
federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. 128 Consequently, several of the appel-
late courts have rejected the intertwining doctrine, causing a wide split
among the federal circuits on this issue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the first
to disagree with the Fifth Circuit's theory. In Dickinson v. Heinold Securi-
ties, Inc 29 plaintiff brought suit against defendant brokerage firm alleging
that the broker had violated federal securities laws by making material mis-
representations in soliciting the plaintiff's securities account. 130 Plaintiff fur-
ther asserted that the defendant had traded his account in a manner that
maximized broker commissions,1
3
1 a practice known as "churning".
3 2
124. Id. at 336.
125. Id. at 325.
126. Id. at 336.
127. Id. Judge Goldberg stated that in a churning case like Miley, an arbitrator's decision
on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, while the federal claim is stayed or heard simultane-
ously, "could essentially rob the federal court of its exclusive jurisdiction." Id.
128. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
129. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
130. Id. at 640. Plaintiff felt that defendant broker failed to trade his account according to
the agreement between the parties that gave defendant limited discretionary power to trade
plaintiff's account in conformance with certain preselected investment strategies. Id. at 639-
40.
131. Id. at 640. In other words, plaintiff contended that defendant excessively traded the
account, receiving a commission for each purchase and sale of stock. See Note, Churning by
Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1967).
132. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324. Churning occurs when a securities broker induces exces-
sively large and frequent transactions in the account in light of the client's investment objec-
tives and acts in disregard of the client's interest. Id. See Note, supra note 131, at 869. To
establish a churning claim, plaintiff must prove that "(1) the trading in his [investor's] account
was excessive in light of his investment objectives; (2) the broker in question exercised control
over the trading in the account; and (3) the broker acted with the intent to defraud or with
willful and reckless disregard for the investors interests .... " Miley, 637 F.2d at 324 (citing
Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
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Plaintiff's contract with the broker provided that all disputes arising out of
the agreement would be submitted to arbitration.13 3 Accordingly, the de-
fendant moved to stay proceedings on the state law tort and contract claims
pending judicial resolution of the nonarbitrable federal securities law
claim. '3 4
The district court decided that the state law claims would proceed to arbi-
tration only if the federal securities claim was resolved against the plaintiff
on defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. 3 5 Defendant's mo-
tion was subsequently denied and the court retained all the claims for a judi-
cial resolution.
136
Defendant appealed the order to the Seventh Circuit, 137 which declined to
adopt the intertwining doctrine in this case. 138 The court stated that exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal securities claim could be maintained by order-
ing arbitration stayed pending judicial resolution of the federal claim. 139
Judge Cudahy, writing for the majority, rejected the notion that the inter-
twining doctrine was more efficient. Instead, he reasoned that duplication of
effort would be minimal because of the collateral estoppel effect of the fed-
eral court's decision on the subsequent arbitration. '" Judge Cudahy further
Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 570
F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978)). When these elements are proved, the
broker may be found in violation of "section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) and SEC Rule l0b-5." 637 F.2d at 324. Rule lOb-5 makes unlawful the use of
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security," 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1984), and churning is described as a "device, scheme or
artifice to defraud." Miley, 637 F.2d at 324 n.4; McNeal v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 890 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979).
133. Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 639.
134. Id. at 641.
135. Id. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate, to whom it had
referred the motion. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 645-46.
139. Id. at 643-44. The Seventh Circuit declared that the district court has discretionary
authority to control the order of the two proceedings, but that the intertwining doctrine pro-
vides no authority for the court to subject arbitrable claims "to adjudication in court merely
because they are related to nonarbitrable claims." Id. at 644 (citing Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus.,
593 F.2d 1266, 1275 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979)).
140. Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644. Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot be again liti-
gated between the same parties in future litigation." City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d
784, 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970)). The prior
judgment is an estoppel regarding issues already decided. E.I. duPont'de Nemours & Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 250 F. Supp. 816, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (citing Cromwell v. County of
Sacremento, 94 U.S. 351 (1876)). Thus, if a federal court issues detailed findings of fact, an
arbitrator will be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating those issues.
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suggested that many claims may be settled after the federal trial. 1 '
Judge Cudahy also criticized the "common evidentiary facts" test em-
ployed by courts to determine if claims are intertwined sufficiently, calling it
the "exception that swallowed the rule."' 42 Although the court acknowl-
edged the Fifth Circuit's attempt to refine the rule in Miley,'43 it stated that
able lawyers could always demonstrate a sufficient intertwining between fed-
eral and pendent claims to prevent arbitration of the latter.'" Emphasizing
the parties' contractual duty to arbitrate and the federal policy favoring en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, 4 ' the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the Arbitration Act required a bifurcated resolution: a federal proceeding
followed by arbitration of the pendent claims, rather than retention of all
claims at the federal level as provided by the intertwining doctrine.
146
In the years following Sibley, Miley and Dickinson, other courts of appeals
have divided on the issue. The Sixth 147 and Eighth 148 Circuits have followed
See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 644; Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 412
(1976); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85, 96
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
141. 661 F.2d at 644.
142. Id. at 645. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
143. 661 F.2d at 646. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The Dickinson court
believed the Fifth Circuit's refinement of the rule undermines efficiency, one of the court's
justifications for its adoption of the intertwining doctrine. 661 F.2d at 646 n.17.
144. 661 F.2d at 646. The court noted the inconsistency of the decisions examining the
degree of intertwining. Id. at 646 n. 18. In Miley, the court held that plaintiff's federal and
pendent state law claims were not severable but intertwined, finding that a jury passing on the
federal claim would have ruled on all the issues relevant to the pendent claims. Id. at 336-37.
On the other hand, in DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 1976), where plaintiff
alleged essentially the same claims alleged in Miley, violation of the securities laws and breach
of fiduciary duty, the court held the federal and pendent claims were severable because the
common and state law submissions involved determination of different issues from the federal
claims. Id. at 57. The court stated that scienter, or knowledge, must be shown to prove a
violation of certain provisions of the securities laws; however, intent need not be proved to
establish breach of contract. Id.
145. 661 F.2d at 642-43.
146. Id. at 644, 646. The court stated that "bifurcation of the federal and pendent state law
claims is the only viable alternative under the present securities and arbitration acts." Id. at
646 (quoting Krause, supra note 80, at 716).
147. See Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983). In Liskey, plaintiff
brought suit against broker defendant after losing over $70,000 of his $100,000 investment,
alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act, state law, and common law. Id. at 315.
Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever the common law and state claims, based on the
agreement plaintiff signed, which provided that disputes regarding the management of the
account would be settled by arbitration. Id. The defendant appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. The circuit court reversed the lower court's deci-
sion, relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Dickinson, 661 F.2d 638, favoring a bifur-
cated approach, a-federal proceeding followed by arbitration. Id. at 320-21. Although it
examined the criticism of Dickinson propounded in Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982), it disagreed with the Cunningham court's conclusion
[Vol. 34:525
Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims
the Dickinson court's bifurcated approach and the Eleventh Circuit' 49 has
adopted the intertwining doctrine. 5 '
III. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION EXAMINES
ARBITRATION
An examination of the arbitration process and the use of arbitration
clauses by the SEC coincided with the judicial rift on the issue of arbi-
trability. In 1976, the SEC began exploring the feasibility of a nationwide
investor dispute resolution system to be made available through self-regula-
tory organizations, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers.' 5 ' The SEC discovered that some inves-
tors disliked arbitration because they doubted the impartiality of arbitration
that the Arbitration Act does not apply to mixed arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. Id. at
320. Instead, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Dickinson court that a bifurcated approach
properly balanced the policies of the Arbitration Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id.
148. Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984). The
Surmans brought suit against defendant brokerage firm, claiming loss of funds due to improper
management of their accounts and misrepresentations regarding the risk and profitability of
their accounts. Id. at 60. They specifically alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act,
state law, and common law. Id. The case came before the Eighth Circuit, after the district
court refused to order arbitration of the common law and state claims. Id. at 60-61. The court
of appeals remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the common law and state
claims be referred to arbitration. Id. at 63. It agreed with Dickinson that the federal court
could preserve its exclusive jurisdiction of the federal securities claim by staying arbitration
pending judicial resolution of the federal securities law claim. Id. at 62. The court conceded
that one of the goals of the Arbitration Act, efficiency, might be better served by trying all the
related claims together, but it did not believe this a valid reason for holding the arbitration
clause unenforceable. Id. at 63.
149. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169 (1lth Cir.
1982). In Haydu, plaintiff originally brought suit in state court charging defendant stockbro-
ker with negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1171. Broker removed the
action to federal court and subsequently moved to stay the action and to compel arbitration in
accordance with the broker-investor contract. Id. Upon plaintiff's motion, the case was re-
manded to state court. Id. Broker then filed in district court, in a separate action, to compel
arbitration. Id. The court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded. Id. On remand, the district court dismissed the action, stating that the state court
had disposed of the federal arbitration claim. Id. Broker appealed, but the court of appeals
affirmed. Id. at 1172. The court explained that plaintiff's amended state court complaint, filed
during this litigation, included a 1933 Securities Act count. Id. Relying on the reasoning in
Miley and Sibley, the court found that an arbitrator deciding plaintiff's state law claims would
be forced to review the same facts needed to establish the securities law claim. Id. The court,
therefore, found the claims intertwined and refused to order arbitration of the pendent state
claims. Id. at 1173.
150. None of these decisions has added any new arguments to the discussion. See supra
notes 147-49.
151. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13470 (April 26, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 23,892
(1977).
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officials associated with these self-regulatory associations.' 52 As a result, the
SEC recommended that all brokerage firms with public customers be re-
quired to establish in-house complaint processing systems.'53 Additionally,
the SEC determined that a uniform code of arbitration should be drafted for
use by organizations offering arbitration facilities.' 5 4 In response, the self-
regulatory groups organized the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion,155 which in turn drafted a proposed Uniform Arbitration Code. The
Code was subsequently approved by the SEC in 1979.156
The Arbitration Code incorporates several provisions not included in for-
mer arbitral systems promoting the impartiality of the arbitral forum. For
disputes involving amounts over $2,500, the Code provides for the appoint-
ment of a panel of no less than three nor more than five arbitrators.' 5 7 A
majority of the panel may not be from the securities industry, unless the
customer requests otherwise.' 5 ' In addition, the Code requires that the par-
ties be informed of the names and affiliations of the arbitrators at least eight
days in advance of the initial hearing date.' 5 9 Finally, it gives the parties
two avenues by which they may exclude certain arbitrators. First, each
152. Id. The Commission further noted that investors may be deterred by the expense of
traveling to the site of arbitration. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. This conference was composed of 10 self-regulatory associations, the Securities Indus-
try Assocation, and three representatives of the public. Second Report of the Securities Indus-
try Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Comm'n, at 2 (Dec. 28, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as SICA Report].
156. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16390 (Nov. 30, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,616
(1979). The Code was adopted by all 10 self-regulatory organization members of the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19813 (May 26,
1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,728 (1983).
157. SICA Report, supra note 155, at 3. The Arbitration Code provision states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Code in all arbitration matters involving
public customers, and where the matter in controversy does not exceed the amount
of $100,000, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration panel which
shall consist of no less than three (3) nor more than five (5) arbitrators, at least a
majority of whom shall not be from the securities industry, unless the public cus-
tomer requests a panel consisting of at least a majority from the securities industry.
(2) In all arbitration matters involving public customers where the amount in con-
troversy is $100,000 or more, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration
panel which shall consist of five (5) arbitrators, at least a majority of whom shall not
be from the securities industry, unless the public customer requests a panel consisting
of at least a majority from the securities industry.
Id. at A-4 to A-5.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3. Section 9 of the Code provides: "The Director of Arbitration shall inform
the parties of the names and business affiliations of the arbitrators at least eight (8) days prior
to the date fixed for the initial hearing session." Id. at A-5.
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party has the right to a peremptory challenge excluding one arbitrator with-
out providing a reason.1"° Second, each party may exclude an arbitrator for
cause. 161
Shortly before it approved the Uniform Arbitration Code, the SEC voiced
concern about the unrestricted use of arbitration clauses in broker-investor
agreements.' 62 The Commission was primarily concerned that most inves-
tors were unaware that Wilko had secured their right to a judicial forum for
claims arising under the federal securities laws. 163 In fact, the SEC had re-
ceived inquiries from individual investors regarding the enforceability of ar-
bitration agreements, which broker-dealers often required as a condition of
doing business." 4 Acting on its concern, the SEC issued a warning to bro-
ker-dealers, in the form of a notice rather than a binding regulation, that
customers must be informed that arbitration agreements do not waive their
right to a judicial forum for claims arising under the federal securities
laws. 165 The Commission did not prescribe the form or language by which
customers were to be informed of their rights, but placed responsibility on
broker-dealers to adequately disclose the meaning and effect of arbitration
clauses. 166 The broker-dealers did not react positively to the Commission's
warning, however, and continued to utilize arbitration clauses without ex-
planatory information regarding the judicial alternative. This course of ac-
tion on the part of the securities industry provoked the SEC to issue a notice
160. Id. at 3. Section 10 of the Code provides:
In an arbitration proceeding being heard by a panel consisting of more than one
(1) arbitrator, each party shall have the right to one (1) peremptory challenge. A
party wishing to exercise a peremptory challenge must do so by notifying the Direc-
tor of Arbitration in writing within five (5) business days of notification of the iden-
tity of the persons named to the panel.
Id. at A-5.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 40,462
(1979). Prior to the opening of an account, broker-dealers often request or require customers
to sign an agreement, frequently a preprinted form, that includes a clause requiring that any
controversy between the broker-dealer and customer be settled by arbitration. Id. See infra
note 187.




166. Id. The Commission stated
[I]t is incumbent upon those who include arbitration clauses in agreements with cus-
tomers to provide adequate information about such rights [to a judicial forum] in
order to make the clauses not misleading. In addition, customers should not be led
to believe, either before or after the occurrence of disputes, that a predispute arbitra-
tion agreement consitutes a waiver of the right to a judicial forum, where such waiver
would be void under the securities laws.
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of proposed rulemaking in May 1983.167
The Commission determined that broker-dealers' use of arbitration
clauses without providing information regarding the judicial alternative is an
inequitable, unjust trade practice.' 61 The Commission explained that inves-
tors are often unaware of their rights, and thus, the investor may submit a
dispute to arbitration believing it the only chance for relief, or the investor
may simply choose not to pursue resolution of a dispute. 169 Furthermore,
broker-dealers may require that the investor sign an agreement, which in-
cludes an arbitration clause, as a prerequisite to doing business. 7 ' The
Commission also noted that such practices may constitute a violation of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 17 1 Thus, the proposed
rule would require broker-dealers to disclose to investors that they do have
recourse to the federal courts for claims arising under the federal securities
laws, despite arbitration clauses included in the broker-investor
agreement. 1
72
The securities industry severely criticized the proposed rule, and charged
that despite the Commission's statement to the contrary, it appeared that the
Commission no longer supported arbitration as a method of resolving bro-
ker-investor disputes.173 The industry claimed that the rule would prejudice
167. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19813 (May 26, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,728
(1983). The Commission found that the securities industry's use of arbitration clauses conflicts
with "legislative history, a thirty-year line of case law, and Commission releases." Id.
A notice of proposed rulemaking is an announcement by a federal agency to the public that
it is engaged in the process of formulating, amending, or repealing a rule. With certain excep-
tions, the Administrative Procedure Act requires publication of notice of rulemaking in the
Federal Register. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982); 1 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.25 (2d ed. 1978).
168. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19813 (May 26, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,728
(1983); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 40,462
(1979).
169. Id.
170. Id. See supra note 162.
171. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July 2, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 40,462
(1979). The antifraud provisions of the securities acts prohibit any stipulation binding a per-
son buying a security to waive compliance with the securities acts' provisions. See supra notes
71, 114. Thus, the Commission found that broker-dealers' practice of requiring their custom-
ers to enter into an agreement providing that all disputes arising under the agreement be sub-
mitted to arbitration, without alerting such customers to their right to a judicial forum, may be
in violation of the antifraud provisions. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 (July
2, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 40,462 (1979). If no information regarding the judicial alternative is
provided to the customer, in effect, the agreement binds the customer to waive rights provided
by the securities acts. See id.
172. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19813 (May 26, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,728
(1983).
173. Poser, Litigate? or Arbitrate?, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, Sept. 13, 1983, at 12;
Arieff, SEC Criticized on Arbitration, Legal Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
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the investor's view of arbitration by creating doubts as to the integrity of
arbitration panels.' 7 4 The industry feared that as a consequence of the pro-
posed rule there would be an increase in the volume of litigation. 7 5
It may be speculated that brokers dislike litigation, and favor arbitration,
for several reasons. Primarily, brokers dislike the costs and delays associ-
ated with federal litigation.' 7 6 Litigation is often accompanied by a long
discovery process, and, because of the possibilities of appeal, lacks the final-
ity of arbitration.' 77 When small sums are involved, brokers are especially
reluctant to enter into protracted litigation.' 78 Further, punitive damages,
generally not allowed in arbitration, may be granted in litigation.' 79 More-
over, federal jury awards are frequently more liberal than arbitration
awards.' Although one industry representative denied that brokers fare
better in arbitration than in litigation,' 8 ' statistics demonstrate that, at least
prior to adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Code, investors did not fare
well on their claims submitted to arbitration.8 2 In commenting on the pro-
posed rule, however, industry persons suggested that because arbitration
procedures have improved significantly, the Commission should ask Con-
gress to repeal the Wilko doctrine, thereby allowing customers to agree to
compulsory arbitration.1
8 3
Despite the industry's objections, the SEC adopted the rule on November
18, 1983,184 noting that informal warnings had failed to curtail the securities
174. Arieff, supra note 173, at 1, col. 4; at 5, col. 2.
175. Poser, supra note 173, at 12.
176. Id.
177. See id.; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
178. Zepfel, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 144 (1977)
(sums involved often too small to "justify incurring the threshold costs of litigation").
179. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
180. See Hyman, supra note 19, at 36. The author states that brokers include arbitration
provisions in contracts, attempting to "avoid liberal federal jury awards in favor of more con-
servative arbitration awards." Id.
181. Arieff, supra note 173, at 5, col. 2.
182. See Zepfel, supra note 178, at 130 n.63. During the period 1957-61, 338 cases were
initially submitted to the New York Stock Exchange for arbitration, but claimant was granted
an award in only 53 cases. Id. During 1982, 473 cases were handled by the New York Stock
Exchange's arbitration division. Arieff, supra note 173, at 5, col. 3. Decisions were reached in
273 cases; customers were successful in 118 cases, noncustomers in 63 cases, and the remaining
cases were dismissed. Id.
183. Arieff, supra note 173, at 5, col. 1.
184. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 18, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404
(1983). The final rule provides in part:
(a) It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker
or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to
bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising under
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industry's use of deceptive arbitration clauses.'8 5 Specifically, the rule pro-
hibits broker-dealers from entering into or maintaining agreements with cus-
tomers purporting to bind them to arbitration of all future disputes,
including those arising under the federal securities laws.' 86  It does allow
broker-dealers to use remaining supplies of preprinted forms including the
standard arbitration clause,'8 7 but requires that such agreements be accom-
panied by a specified written disclosure.' 8
By promulgating this rule in the face of the securities industry's opposi-
tion and continued failure to modify its use of arbitration clauses, the SEC
has indicated that the public investor still needs protection in dealing with
the securities industry. Thus, the Commission appears to adopt the position
that when the policies of the federal securities laws and the Arbitration Act
conflict, principles underlying investor protection must override interests in
efficient resolution of disputes through arbitration.8 9 The Commission, in
the federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant to which
it effects transactions with or for a customer.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, until December 31, 1984 a bro-
ker or dealer may use existing supplies of customer agreement forms if all such agree-
ments entered into with public customers after Dec. 28, 1983 are accompanied by the
separate written disclosure:
Although you have signed a customer agreement form with FIRM NAME that
states that you are required to arbitrate any future dispute or controversy that may
arise between us, you are not required to arbitrate any dispute or controversy that
arises under the federal securities laws but instead can resolve any such dispute or
controversy through litigation in the courts.
Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1984)).
185. Id. Prior to its 1979 warning, the Commission's staff had advised broker-dealers and
security industry organizations of the need to modify arbitration clauses in light of Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), but to the Commission's knowledge, no such changes were made in
these agreements nor did broker-dealers provide any additional disclosure to investors regard-
ing their rights. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984 n.7 (July 2, 1979), 44 Fed.
Reg. 40,462 (1979).
186. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1984). See supra note 184.
187. An example of a typical arbitration clause prior to promulgation of this rule is as
follows:
Any controversy arising out of or relating to the account of the undersigned, to
transactions with you for the undersigned or to this Agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Governors of the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange as the undersigned may
elect. If the undersigned does not make such election by registered mail addressed to
you at your main office within five days after demand by you that the undersigned
make such election, then you may make such election. Judgment upon any award
rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
See Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 315 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(b) (1984). See supra note 184.
189. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984, supra note 163.
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fact, based its actions on Wilko v. Swan, 19' which held that Congress had
determined that investors should be entitled to the protection of federal
courts for the resolution of disputes arising under the federal securities
laws. '' Furthermore, the Commission stated that the Supreme Court's sub-
sequent decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., upholding enforcement of
an arbitration agreement, was restricted to the particular facts of that
case. 92 Although the Commission noted that contract and state claims may
be referred to arbitration, and that there are instances where federal securi-
ties claims and contract and state claims are based on the same set of cir-
cumstances, it did not adopt a position on this debate among the circuit
courts. 1
9 3
IV. BYRD v DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS; INc : ACCOMMODATING THE
POLICY UNDERLYING THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS WITH
THE INCREASING USE OF ARBITRATION
A. Adopting the Intertwining Doctrine Over A Bifurcated Approach
In 1984, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,' 94 a case that may resolve the wide split in the circuits and establish a
uniform rule for mixed arbitrable and nonarbitrable securities claims. In
Byrd, a customer sold his dental practice and invested the proceeds with a
brokerage firm, signing a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate dis-
putes arising out of the management of the account.'9" In the course of six
months, the customer's account declined from $160,000 to less than $60,000,
and he brought suit alleging improper handling of the account and misrepre-
sentation by the broker that the account was making a profit.' 96 Plaintiff
190. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-15984, 34-19813,
34-20397, supra notes 163, 167, 184.
191. 346 U.S. at 438.
192. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15984, supra note 163.
193. Id.
194. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 83-1708 (June 11, 1984).
195. Id. at 553.
196. Id. The broker induced plaintiff to invest by representing that he would receive a
monthly income of $4,000 from his investment. On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 3,
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 83-1708 (June
11, 1984). The broker then altered the client information form so as to misrepresent respon-
dent's investment objectives and his qualifications to invest in speculative investments. Id.
Subsequently, he traded options on respondent's account without respondent's prior consent.
Id. Further, the broker bought and sold securities excessively, thereby engaging in so-called
"churning" of respondent's account. Id. See supra note 132. When respondent received his
monthly statements, indicating the declining balance, he was told to disregard the statements
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alleged five separate claims, the first for violation of sections 10(b), 15(c) and
20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the remaining four for viola-
tions of state law. 197 Pursuant to the arbitration clause, Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. (Dean Witter) moved for an order severing the federal claim from
the pendent state claim and requested staying arbitration of the latter until
judicial resolution of the federal securities claim.' 98 The district court de-
nied the motion and Dean Witter appealed to the Ninth Circuit.' 99
Noting that district courts in the Ninth Circuit are split on this issue,2°
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's adop-
tion of the intertwining doctrine, finding that the pendent and federal claims
alleged in Byrd depended upon the same facts.2 ° ' The court noted the ap-
proach taken in Liskey20 2 and Dickinson,2°3 where arbitration of state claims
was stayed pending judicial resolution of the federal securities claim, but
found this approach lacking because it might frustrate the purpose of the
Arbitration Act--efficient resolution of disputes.2°' The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Arbitration Act did not anticipate allegations of arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims arising out of the same circumstances, nor did it
anticipate the Supreme Court's 1953 determination that the federal securities
laws' policy of investor protection is preeminent over the Arbitration Act's
policy of economic dispute resolution.2 °5
Thus, Byrd stands for the proposition that courts utilizing a bifurcated
approach are not serving the policy of either the federal securities laws or the
Arbitration Act.20 6 When arbitration is stayed pending resolution of the
federal securities claim in a judicial proceeding, the goal of a speedy result
because they were not accurate. Id. In fact, he was told that his account was making a profit.
Id.
197. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Memorandum for the Petitioner at 2-3, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 83-1708 (June 11, 1984).
198. Byrd, 726 F.2d at 553.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 554. See Roueche v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 554 F. Supp.
338 (D. Hawaii 1983) (adopting the bifurcated approach); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (adopting the intertwining doctrine); Milani v.
Conticommodity Servs., 462 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (adopting the intertwining doc-
trine); Macchiavelli v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (adopting
the bifurcated approach).
201. 726 F.2d at 554.
202. 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra note 147.
203. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
204. 726 F.2d at 554.
205. Id. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
206. Id.
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through arbitration has been frustrated.2" 7 Likewise, if the federal trial is
stayed, pending arbitration of the pendent claims, the investor's right to a
federal forum loses its effectiveness because the federal forum will not have
exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities claim.2"'
B. The Impact on the Investor of the Intertwining and Bifurcated
Approaches
The Byrd court's analysis raises questions concerning how the two differ-
ent approaches taken by the circuit courts affect the public investor. The
intertwining doctrine places the emphasis on investor protection as provided
by the federal securities laws.209 On the other hand, the bifurcated approach
attempts to balance the policies of investor protection along with the goal of
quick, economic resolution of disputes.210 In either case, the approach uti-
lized may have a significant effect on the investor's claim.
One of the major benefits accorded to the investor by the consolidated
federal proceeding required by the intertwining doctrine is that this ap-
proach preserves the right to a federal forum. Although the Uniform Arbi-
tration Code has improved the investor's procedural rights in arbitration
proceedings, 2 1 the federal forum still provides certain safeguards not avail-
able in arbitration. Among these are trial by jury, the federal rules of evi-
dence, and full rights of discovery.21 2 Jury awards are generally more liberal
than arbitration awards,21 3 perhaps because a jury is more sympathetic to an
investor than an arbitration panel, which includes members of the securities
industry.2 4 Also, unlike a jury, arbitrators may not receive judicial instruc-
tion on the law, even if they desire such advice.215 Full discovery rights are
important because they enable investors to obtain otherwise unavailable in-
formation regarding their accounts that may be helpful in the prosecution of
207. Id.
208. Id. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 108-27, 149 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 10.
213. Hyman, supra note 19, at 36.
214. The Uniform Arbitration Code provides only that the majority of the arbitration
panel not be from the securities industry. See supra note 157.
215. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (arbitrators receive no
judicial instruction on the law); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (arbitrators must
make determinations without judicial instruction on the law). The Wilko Court stated that
although the provisions of the 1933 Securities Act favor the buyer, the advantage is lessened
where arbitrators must make "subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
violator of the Act" without judicial instruction on the law. Id. at 435-36.
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claims based on the handling of the account.216 Brokers usually have more
information than investors for the preparation of a case.217 More impor-
tantly, however, the federal forum entitles the investor to judicial review,
whereas arbitration awards are rendered without a statement of reasons,
making meaningful judicial review difficult, if not impossible. 21" Although
the Federal Arbitration Act provides certain grounds for vacating an
award, 2'9 as does case law,220 it is difficult to prove that any of the grounds
exist without a written opinion.22' The securities industry contends that the
benefits associated with arbitration-efficiency and economy-are dimin-
ished when written opinions are required.222 The industry maintains that
these benefits would also be diminished if full discovery rights were added to
the arbitration process.223
Another benefit of the consolidated federal proceeding is that it preserves
216. See Zepfel, supra note 178, at 131. The author states that although the right of sub-
poena is generally available to parties in an arbitration proceeding, lack of full discovery rights
hinders the investor in gaining information important to the success of his claim. Id. For
example, full discovery rights may enable the investor "to learn the volume of commissions
generated by his account in relation to other accounts, the nature of recommendations made
by the broker's research department, and possible conflicts of interest." Id.
217. Id.
218. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Sobel v. Hertz Warner & Co., 469 F.2d
1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972); Zepfel, supra note 178, at 147.
219. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). The statute provides that an arbitral award may be vacated:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
Id.
220. Case law holds that arbitral awards may be overturned if an arbitrator fails to disclose
substantial dealings with one of the parties, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), or if an award is rendered in manifest disregard of the law,
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (dictum).
221. See id. at 436 (cannot examine arbitrators' application of the law without a written
record); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972) (plaintiff contended
that if arbitrators do not provide reasons, reviewing courts can only speculate on the grounds
for an award).
222. See Sobel, 469 F.2d at 1215. The Sobel court noted the New York Stock Exchange's
comment that requiring arbitrators to give reasons for their decision might put an end to
arbitration altogether. Id. at 1215 n.7.
223. Neville, supra note 10, at 10-11. The author states that an arbitration process that
included full discovery rights and other provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would, in effect, create a private court system that would defeat the purpose of arbitration. Id.
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the investor's claim for punitive damages. Although punitive damages are
not recoverable under the federal securities laws,224 many state laws permit
punitive damages.225 In those states, when a state law violation is joined to a
federal securities violation, the federal court may grant punitive damages.226
However, if the common law and state claims are submitted to arbitration,
the punitive damages claim will likely be lost because arbitration rarely pro-
vides for such damages. 227 This is the reason that brokers have traditionally
advocated arbitration clauses, that is, they reduce the chance of large jury
224. Neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
for punitive damages in those sections allowing for damages. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771(2)
78bb (1982).
225. Krause, supra note 80, at 695 n.18. Punitive damages are generally allowed under
state law and have been awarded in securities cases for state law violations such as breach of
fiduciary duty and fraud. Id. See Hyman, supra note 19, at 24. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at
329 (punitive damages allowable under Texas law under certain circumstances); Flaks v. Koe-
gel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1974) (punitive damages may be recoverable in action alleg-
ing federal securities violations and common law fraud and deceit, based on the pendent
common law claim); Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(New York law allows for punitive damages for state claim of fraud and deceit, although
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
226. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming
punitive damages award based on common law fraud claim in connection with violation of
federal securities laws); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 920 (1973) ("it is well established that exemplary damages may be awarded under
state law when a state law violation is joined with the lOb-5 complaint"); Young v. Taylor, 466
F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972) (punitive damages recoverable when federal securities
claim joined with pendent common law and state claims).
227. Courts have reached different results on the question of whether arbitrators may grant
punitive damages. Some courts have held that under certain circumstances, an arbitrator does
have power to award punitive damages. See, e.g., Local 416, Sheetmetal Workers Int'l Assoc.
v. Helgesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D. Wisc. 1971). In Local 416, the court held
that where the labor agreement did not specify remedies, the arbitrator had discretionary au-
thority to award punitive damages, so long as the award was reasonable in light of the arbitra-
tion board's findings. Id. at 816. Other courts have held arbitrators only have power to grant
punitive damages when they are given such power by the contract authorizing arbitration.
See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
Automotive Lodge No. 1486, 534 F. Supp. 638, 640-41 (D. Md. 1982) (punitive damages
award may not be sustained where not authorized by the collective bargaining agreement);
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 486 F. Supp. 675, 684 (D. Nev. 1980) (arbi-
trator had no authority to award punitive damages where not demanded in claim); Interna-
tional Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (arbitrator's grant of punitive award not enforceable because not authorized by the labor
contract). Some courts, however, refuse to allow an arbitrator to grant punitive damages even
when the contract does provide for such damages, on the grounds that punitive damages are "a
social exemplary 'remedy,' not a private compensatory remedy." Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,
40 N.Y.2d 354, 358, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976); In re Silverberg, 75
A.D.2d 817, 819, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482-83 (1980) (arbitrator precluded by public policy from
awarding punitive damages).
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awards.228
The primary advantage accorded to the investor by a bifurcated resolution
is economic rather than procedural. Although the intertwining doctrine
provides for one proceeding and the bifurcated approach involves two pro-
ceedings, the bifurcated approach allows the investor to forego the poten-
tially time-consuming and expensive federal proceeding for a much quicker,
less expensive result through arbitration.229 Although investors may elect
either a federal proceeding or arbitration, large attorneys' fees and the sub-
stantial time lags accompanying federal litigation may persuade investors to
choose arbitration.23 °
Courts that embrace the intertwining doctrine view the investor's choice
to arbitrate as a nullification of the purpose of the federal securities laws.23'
The securities laws granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of federal
securities claims so that they could adequately protect the investor.232 By
allowing the investor to waive the federal court proceeding in favor of arbi-
tration, however, this purpose is defeated.233 Moreover, even where the in-
vestor does not waive the federal proceeding, the court's exclusive
jurisdiction may be rendered meaningless when arbitration precedes the fed-
eral trial because the court may then be bound to decisions reached in
arbitration.234
C. The Future of the Wilko Doctrine
The Byrd case allows the Supreme Court to address the conflicting poli-
cies of the Arbitration Act and the federal securities laws. The Court's deci-
sion may have the effect of either extending or restricting the Wilko doctrine.
In Wilko, the Court clearly held that the purpose of the securities laws must
228. See Hyman, supra note 19, at 26; see also supra text accompanying notes 213-214.
229. Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 n.13 (7th Cir. 1981) (bifurcation
may prove burdensome, forcing plaintiffs to surrender their right to a judicial resolution in
favor of arbitration); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 584 n.7
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (bifurcation creates "incentive for plaintiffs to drop one set of claims to obtain
speedier justice").
230. Id. (plaintiffs may drop federal cause of action to obtain "faster and cheaper results
through arbitration"). See supra text accompanying note 177.
231. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing arbitra-
tor to make primary conclusions robs federal court of its exclusive jurisdiction); Cunningham
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 584 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (purpose of exclu-
sive jurisdiction for federal securities claims is defeated when plaintiffs forego federal action for
arbitration).
232. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
233. Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. 578, 584 n.7. See supra note 231.
234. Miley, 637 F.2d at 336. See supra note 231.
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take precedence over the Arbitration Act.23 5 Although the Court enforced
an arbitration agreement in Scherk, despite alleged federal securities viola-
tions, the decision was based primarily on the international character of the
agreement.236 In more recent cases, which did not involve securities or pro-
tective legislation, the Court has demonstrated its determination to enforce
arbitration agreements. 237 Thus, should the Court follow this previous line
of cases, it will uphold the Ninth Circuit's decision in Byrd, extending the
Wilko doctrine to provide that when there are mixed arbitrable and nonarbi-
trable claims, arbitration of the former must be denied to preserve the fed-
eral court's exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities claims.
Practical and economic considerations, however, may lead the Court to an
opposite result. First, bifurcation would reduce the court caseload, a prob-
lem of increasing concern.238 Second, increased regulation of arbitration
clauses by the SEC and improved arbitration procedures have lessened the
need for the courts to actively protect the public investor.239
Prior to the recent regulations and procedures approved by the SEC, one
commentator suggested that Wilko should be overruled once "clear, unam-
biguous and fair arbitration provisions are formulated.",24" Members of the
securities industry have also recently requested that Congress repeal the
Wilko rule.241 Whether the new arbitration procedures may be classified as
"clear, unambiguous and fair" is debatable, but the SEC does not appear to
agree that Wilko should be overruled. To date, the Commission has not
responded to the securities industry's request that it ask Congress to repeal
the doctrine.242 Rather, the Commission based its regulation of arbitration
235. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
236. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-21. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
237. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). For a discussion of these cases, see supra
note 81.
238. See Dickinson, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Role of the States in Securities
Regulation, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1980). The author states that under the helm of
Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court has endeavored to reduce the federal judiciary's
workload in the area of securities litigation. Id. Bifurcation would reduce the federal courts'
caseload, although only slightly, because federal courts would only hear and resolve federal
securities claims, not arbitrable common law and state claims pendent to the federal claim.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 151-93 and accompanying text.
240. Krause, supra note 80, at 721.
241. Arieff, supra note 173, at 5, col. 1. See supra text accompanying note 183.
242. The Commission's promulgation of the final rule is its only response to the industry's
criticism of the proposed rule and its request that the Commission petition Congress for repeal
of Wilko. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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clauses on the Wilko decision.243 Furthermore, its criticism of the securities
industry for failing to heed its advice and warning regarding modification of
arbitration clauses suggests that the Commission would not approve the
overruling of Wilko.2 4 Likewise, the Court's prior decisions do not suggest
that it is willing to overrule Wilko.245 In Scherk, the Court was very careful
to emphasize that the result was based on the international character of the
agreement.246 Thus, the investor's right to a federal forum for the adjudica-
tion of federal securities claims appears safe despite improved arbitration
procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress did not foresee a conflict arising between the Federal Arbitration
Act and the federal securities laws. When it enacted the former, it intended
to provide a ready forum for the speedy, impartial resolution of disputes. In
enacting the latter, Congress sought to protect the investor by placing the
investor in a bargaining position equal to that of the broker's. In Wilko, the
Court was unable to reconcile these two competing policies and held that
Congress' desire to protect the investor must prevail.
Byrd presents the Court with the opportunity to end the controversy over
the handling of state and common law claims pendent to a federal securities
claim. The Court may either determine that investor protection must re-
main the preeminent public policy by adopting the intertwining doctrine or
it may uphold the bifurcated approach, recognizing the increasing impor-
247tance of arbitration in today's society. Yet, even if the Court approves
243. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20397 (Nov. 28, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg.
53,404 (1983). See also supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
244. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
247. On March 4, 1985, after this Note had gone to print, the Supreme Court delivered its
decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4222 (U.S. March 5, 1985). The
Court held that the Arbitration Act requires that federal district courts compel arbitration of
pendent arbitrable claims when a party files a motion to compel. Id. at 4225. Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the unanimous Court, reviewed the legislative history of the Arbitration Act
and determined that the primary purpose of the Act was not to promote speedy resolution of
claims, but rather to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made arbitration agreements. Id.
at 4223. Thus, he rejected the argument that a bifurcated proceeding frustrates the purpose of
the Act. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04, 206-07. In support, the Court cited its
opinion in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), in
which it upheld enforcement of an arbitration agreement even though bifurcated proceedings
would result. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4224. In Moses, the Court stated that the Arbitration Act "re-
quires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Id.
(quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 20). See supra note 81.
Justice Marshall also denied that the federal court would necessarily lose its exclusive juris-
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bifurcation of securities claims, it will not totally relinquish its role as pro-
tector of the public securities investor by overruling Wilko. Not only would
such a ruling contradict the intent of Congress, but the SEC's recent regula-
tion of arbitration clauses demonstrates that the public investor still requires
diction of federal securities claims if arbitration preceded the federal trial. 53 U.S.L.W. at
4224. Although the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits contend that the federal court will be
bound to decisions reached in a prior arbitration proceeding through the principle of collateral
estoppel, the Court stated that the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is uncertain. Id.
It explained that the full faith and credit statute requires federal courts to give the same effect
to a State's judicial proceedings as would the courts of that State, but stated that arbitration is
not a judicial proceeding. Id. Arbitration proceedings, therefore, may not necessarily have a
collateral estoppel effect on subsequent federal court proceedings. The Court refused to ad-
dress the question of what preclusive effect arbitration proceedings do have, but concluded that
a stay of arbitration proceedings until resolution of the federal claim is not required. Id. Jus-
tice Marshall stated that federal district courts should neither dictate the order of the bifur-
cated proceedings nor should they refuse to compel arbitration in order to protect the federal
courts' jurisdiction of federal securities claims. Id. at 4224-25. He did not allow, however,
that courts shall consider the federal interests in determining the preclusive effects of an earlier
arbitration. Id. at 4224. Concurring in the Court's opinion, Justice White added that each of
the two proceedings should go forward with neither being delayed until resolution of the other.
Id. at 4224.
Justice White also expanded on the Court's refusal to resolve whether Wilko applies to
claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or under rule lOb-5. Elaborating
on Justice Stewart's opinion in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), Justice
White increased the uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Wilko doctrine to claims
brought under the 1934 Act and implied that lower courts are erroneously assuming that
Wilko does apply to such claims. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4225. He noted that when Wilko held arbi-
tration agreements unenforceable with respect to claims under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, it based
its decision on the presence of certain language in the 1933 Act not present in the 1934 Act.
Id. at 4225. For example, § 12(2) of the 1933 Act creates a special right of recovery for mis-
representation, whereas, the cause of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act is implied, rather
than express. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
The Court's decision in Byrd affirmed its determination to enforce the strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration, established by passage of the Arbitration Act in 1924. Basing its deci-
sion on the plain language of the Act, the Court stated that the Act gives federal courts no
discretion to refuse to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims. See id. at 4223. Because Justice
Marshall denies that expeditious resolution of claims is the primary purpose of the Arbitration
Act, there is no contrary federal interest to outweigh the dictates of the Act. Id. He further
asserted that arbitration does not interfere with the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction of
securities claims. Id. at 4224.
The Byrd decision, therefore, clearly answers the question of how federal courts should treat
arbitrable pendent claims in securities litigation, but it leaves many questions unanswered.
The Court acknowledges that it is not responding to its own question regarding how much
preclusive effect arbitration proceedings should have. This question, the Court stated, does not
actually present itself until arbitration is complete. Id. Thus, whether an arbitration will bind
a federal court, depriving it of its exclusive jurisdiction of federal securities claims, cannot be
answered until the question is properly presented. The Court also leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of applicability of the Wilko doctrine to claims brought under the 1934 Act, leaving fed-
eral courts to reexamine the issue in future cases.
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the protection of the federal courts to maintain an equal bargaining position
with the securities industry.
Mary Elizabeth Bierman
